Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria by Williamson, Jon
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Williamson, Jon  (2018) Establishing the teratogenicity of Zika and evaluating causal criteria.
  Synthese .    ISSN 0039-7857.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1866-9






S . I . : PH ILOSOPHY OF EP IDEMIOLOGY




Received: 6 October 2017 / Accepted: 28 June 2018
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
The teratogenicity of the Zika virus was considered established in 2016, and is an
interesting case because three different sets of causal criteria were used to assess
teratogenicity. This paper appeals to the thesis of Russo and Williamson (Int Stud
Philos Sci 21(2):157–170, 2007) to devise an epistemological framework that can be
used to compare and evaluate sets of causal criteria. The framework can also be used to
decide when enough criteria are satisfied to establish causality. Arguably, the three sets
of causal criteria considered here offer only a rudimentary assessment of mechanistic
studies, and some suggestions are made as to alternative ways to establish causality.
Keywords Hill criteria · Shepard criteria · Russo–Williamson thesis · Causal
criteria · Causal indicators · Zika virus · Teratogenicity
1 Introduction
In his hugely influential 1965 paper Austin Bradford Hill put forward a set of evidential
criteria for establishing a causal claim (Hill 1965).1 Hill’s criteria are now widely
used, particularly when assessing a causal claim in the absence of conclusive evidence
provided by randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Note that there are many situations in
which RCTs on humans are rarely, if ever, available: for instance, when assessing harms
caused by environmental exposure to chemicals—e.g., assessing the carcinogenicity
of quinolene—or assessing harms caused by infectious diseases—e.g., assessing the
teratogenicity of Zika.
1 These are indicators of causality, rather than necessary and sufficient conditions for causality (see, e.g.,
Phillips and Goodman 2004). However, these indicators are often called ‘causal criteria’, and we will adopt
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While Hill’s criteria provide an idea of the kinds of considerations to take into
account when assessing a causal claim, such as the dose–response gradient, Hill offers
no clear advice as to how the criteria combine to provide an overall evaluation of the
causal claim. Moreover, there are sets of causal criteria other than Hill’s and it is
unclear as to how to compare the relative merits of different sets of criteria.
This paper puts forward a new approach to these problems. It develops an evidential
framework that can be used to understand the role of causal criteria in establishing a
causal claim and to help decide when causality is established. Such an overarching
framework is an important step towards clearer and better methods for assessing causal
claims.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we see that at least three different
sets of causal criteria were used to show that Zika virus causes birth defects: Hill’s
criteria, Shepard’s criteria and a third, new set of criteria. This leads to two questions:
how should sets of criteria be evaluated and compared? How should criteria within
a single set of criteria weigh against one another to establish causality? In order to
address these questions, Sect. 3 develops a new evidential framework. In Sect. 4, this
framework is used to shed some light on the two questions. Section 5 shows that the
framework is amenable to a quantitative Bayesian analysis, if required. Conclusions
are drawn in Sect. 6.
2 Howwas teratogenicity established?
Zika virus is a flavivirus, first identified in monkeys in the Zika forest in Uganda in
1947 and in humans in Uganda and Tanzania in 1952. It is spread by mosquitoes of
the Aedes genus, which also transmit dengue, chikungunya and yellow fever. The first
large outbreak was reported on the island of Yap, Micronesia, in 2007, and the virus
is now present across tropical regions of Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific.
It achieved notoriety in 2015 when an outbreak in Brazil was linked to birth defects.
It is now widely agreed that Zika virus infection during pregnancy has been estab-
lished to be a cause of abnormal development of the embryo, leading to stillbirths,
microcephaly, damage to eyesight and hearing, and Guillain–Barré syndrome (other
congenital abnormalities are speculated to be effects of Zika, but these links have
arguably not been established). A cause of abnormal physiological development is
called ‘teratogenic’. The question arises as to how the teratogenicity of Zika virus was
established.2 It turns out that this question poses an interesting problem for medical
methodology, because epidemiological studies on their own were insufficient to estab-
lish causality—other indicators of causality were required—and it is not clear how the
lists of criteria compare, nor how criteria within a list combine to establish causality.
Three studies are particularly relevant to the question of how the teratogenicity of
Zika became established.
2 A causal claim is established when the epistemological standard is reached for treating the claim as
evidence for other claims. Epistemologists disagree as to what constitutes evidence and when one can
treat a proposition as evidence—established is used here as a neutral term, not allied to any particular
epistemological theory of evidence.
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Table 1 The criteria of Hill (1965)
Strength Strength of the observed association
Consistency Consistency of the observed association
Specificity A narrowly defined cause and effect (disease), and the cause is not
associated with other diseases
Temporality The putative cause occurs before early stages of the disease
Biological gradient A dose–response curve
Plausibility Plausible given the biological knowledge of the day
Coherence No conflict with the known history and biology of the disease
Experiment Confirming experimental evidence
Analogy Similar effects of similar causes
Table 2 The criteria of Shepard (1994)
1 Proven exposure to agent at critical time(s) in prenatal development
2 Consistent findings by two or more epidemiologic studies of high quality
3 Careful delineation of the clinical cases
4 Rare environmental exposure associated with rare defect
5 Teratogenicity in experimental animals
6 The association should make biologic sense
7 Proof in an experimental system that the agent acts in an unaltered state
Frank et al. (2016) applied Austin Bradford Hill’s criteria (Table 1) to the ques-
tion of whether Zika virus is a cause of microcephaly, and concluded that causality
was not established. This study was published in March 2016. The authors argued as
follows: there was insufficient evidence of a strong association; evidence of the asso-
ciation was inconsistent and limited; there was no specificity, because other causes of
microcephaly were known;3 temporality was satisfied in individual cases; evidence
for biological gradient was apparently not yet available; there was biological plausibil-
ity; coherence was satisfied; experimental evidence was limited; there was significant
analogical evidence (two other flaviviruses cause congenital brain malformations and
other viruses cause microcephaly). Frank et al. (2016) champion the Hill criteria as
a means of establishing causality in this case, but at a rather intuitive level: they do
not specify which combinations of criteria would be sufficient to establish causality.
However, they clearly suggest that, in combination, the evidence was not enough to
establish causality in the Zika case. Doshi (2016), in a BMJ editorial published in
April 2016, also suggests that causality was not established at that time. Broutet et al.
(2016), also published in April, concurs.
Rasmussen et al. (2016), on the other hand, applied Shepard’s criteria for establish-
ing teratogenicity (Table 2), and concluded that causality was established. Their study
3 Hill (1965) introduces specificity in the context of a case where the cause is not associated with other
diseases. Perhaps he would also view as specific the situation in which the disease is not associated with
other causes, which is the situation considered by Frank et al. (2016). Either way, the specificity desideratum
is not satisfied in the case of Zika.
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Table 3 The criteria of Krauer
et al. (2017) Temporality
Biological plausibility
Strength of association







was published in May 2016. They argued that criteria 1, 3, 4 and 6 were met, while the
others were not—in particular, epidemiological evidence was limited. Note that Shep-
ard maintained that, to establish teratogenicity, it is necessary to satisfy criteria 1 and
3, and either 2 or 4 (Shepard 1994, Table 1). Rasmussen et al. (2016) interpret Shepard
as saying that such a combination of conditions is sufficient to establish teratogenicity,
and that since criteria 1, 3 and 4 were satisfied, teratogenicity was established. They
also say that all Hill’s criteria except for experiment were met, and concluded that
teratogenicity was established also on Hill’s account. They attributed the difference
of opinion with Frank et al. (2016) to new evidence: two epidemiological studies, an
experimental study and a case report. Rasmussen et al. (2016) represented the USA-
based Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an influential organisation,
which subsequently announced, ‘Based on rigorous peer-reviewed evaluation of the
scientific evidence, CDC and international partners have concluded that Zika virus
infection during pregnancy is a cause of microcephaly and other severe brain defects
(CDC 2016, p. 33).’
The third relevant study is that of Krauer et al. (2017), representing the position
of the World health Organisation (WHO). This study was accepted for publication
in November 2016 and was published in January 2017. The study took the form of a
systematic review of the literature and appealed to the list of criteria of Table 3. Krauer
et al. (2017) did not define these terms, but several of them are intended to be versions of
corresponding criteria of Hill (Broutet et al. 2016). There are three criteria not present
in Hill’s list. Experiments in animals is an analogue of Shepard’s criterion (5). When
assessing whether Zika virus causes congenital brain abnormalities, exclusion of alter-
native explanations considered alternative infections, maternal exposure to alcohol or
medication, genetic causes and environmental toxins and heavy metals. Cessation
considered the reduction in congenital abnormalities following seasonal decline in the
vector mosquitoes and following increase in population immunity. The overall con-
clusion was that Zika virus infection being a cause of congenital brain abnormalities
and Guillain–Barré syndrome was the most likely explanation of available evidence.
The authors do not explicitly infer this best explanation, nor do they explicitly claim to
have established causality. However, they do say that ‘We reached the same conclusion
as Rasmussen et al. (2016), but the larger number of studies allowed a more compre-
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hensive and balanced summary of evidence and of evidence gaps’ (Krauer et al. 2017,
p. 17), which suggests that they take causality to be established. In support of this sug-
gestion, on 6 September 2016, shortly after this systematic review was submitted for
publication (which was on 25 August 2016), the WHO stated that ‘There is scientific
consensus that Zika virus is a cause of microcephaly and Guillain–Barré syndrome’
(WHO 2016).
It is fair to say, then, that the teratogenicity of Zika virus was considered established
by the main players in the community mid-to-late 2016. However, three different sets
of criteria were applied to assess causality.4 Given that multiple sets of criteria were
invoked and different conclusions were reached, it is not clear whether the difference
in conclusions is attributable to a difference in evidence, the difference in the chosen
set of criteria, or the way in which the criteria were applied and weighed against
one another. From a methodological point of view, this raises two questions. First,
how should sets of criteria be evaluated and compared? Second, how should different
criteria within a single set of criteria weigh against one another to establish causality?
3 An evidential framework
These two questions will be addressed by building an epistemological framework that
can be used to integrate and evaluate causal criteria. This framework will appeal to
two key observations.
The first is the epistemological thesis of Russo and Williamson (2007, Sects. 1–4).
This says that in order to establish a causal claim in medicine, one normally needs to
establish two things: that the putative cause and effect are appropriately correlated and
that there is some underlying mechanism which can explain instances of the putative
effect by appeal to the putative cause and can account for magnitude of the observed
correlation. It is not enough to establish a correlation on its own, because, as is well
known, a correlation may have one of a number of explanations, only one of which is
causation—others include various biases and confounding, for instance. The existence
of a mechanism of action distinguishes those correlations that are causal from those that
are not. On the other hand, it is not enough to establish the existence of a mechanism
on its own, because mechanisms are complex, involving multiple entities, activities
and organisational features, and the existence of a mechanism connecting the putative
cause to the putative effect does not guarantee a net effect. Moreover, mechanisms can
counteract one another, again leading to an absence of a net effect. The existence of
an overall correlation distinguishes those mechanisms that underpin genuine causal
relationships from those that do not. Thus, one needs to establish the existence of both
a correlation and a mechanism.
Williamson (2018) provides a recent detailed statement and a defence of this episte-
mological thesis. There has been some controversy around a related suggestion, namely
that one needs to identify the details of a mechanism in order to establish a causal
claim (see, e.g., Broadbent 2011; Howick 2011). However, the Russo–Williamson
4 In addition, in February 2016 a WHO committee also suggested the use of Koch’s postulates (Heymann
et al. 2016, p. 720), a view endorsed by Doshi (2016).
123
Synthese
Thesis only requires establishing the existence of a mechanism and the existence of a
correlation—not the details of the mechanism nor the extent of the correlation (Illari
2011; Williamson 2018, Sect. 2.1). The thesis has been supported by analysing med-
ical practice in a number of historical case studies. For example: establishing that the
Epstein–Barr virus is a cause of Burkitt’s Lymphoma, and establishing that the human
papillomavirus is a cause of cervical cancer (Clarke 2011); establishing that smoking
causes lung cancer, failing to establish that heavy drinking causes lung cancer, and
establishing smoking as a cause of heart disease (Gillies 2011). Surveys of present-day
research papers also provide some support: for example, Russo and Williamson (2011)
argue for the thesis in the practice of autopsy and Darby and Williamson (2011) cite
case studies in biomedical imaging.
In sum, the first key component of the epistemological framework is the Russo–
Williamson Thesis. While this first observation concerns what needs to be established,
the second observation concerns the studies that do the establishing. The observation
is that these studies can broadly be divided into two kinds.
On the one hand there are studies that repeatedly measure the putative cause A
and effect B together, usually in conjunction with other variables that are potential
confounders. These studies are often called clinical studies or statistical studies for
assessing whether A is a cause of B. There are various subclasses of such studies. In
an experimental study such as a randomised controlled trial (RCT), the measurements
are made after an experimental intervention. If no intervention is performed, the study
is an observational or epidemiological study: a cohort study follows a group of people
over time; a case control study divides the study population into those who have
a disease and those who do not and surveys each cohort; a case series is a study
that tracks patients who received a similar treatment or exposure. An n-of-1 study
consists of repeated measurements of a single individual; other studies measure several
individuals. For ease of reference we will use ‘clinical studies’ to refer to all these
kinds of study, despite the fact that such studies need not be conducted in the clinical
setting.
The second kind of study is a mechanistic study. This kind of study investigates
features of the mechanism by which A is hypothesised to cause B. For example, it might
determine whether some further variable C is an intermediary between A and B, or it
might investigate the entities, activities or organisational features of the mechanism of
action. Mechanistic studies can involve direct manipulation (e.g., in vitro experiments),
direct observation (e.g., biomedical imaging, autopsy, a case report), confirmed theory
(e.g., biochemistry), analogy (e.g., animal experiments) or simulation (e.g., agent-
based models). In addition, a clinical study for the claim that A is a cause of C , where
C is an intermediate variable on the mechanism from A to B, is also a mechanistic
study for the claim that A is a cause of B because it provides evidence of the details
of the mechanism from A to B. However, a clinical study for the claim that A is a
cause of B is not normally a mechanistic study for the claim that A is a cause of B
because, although it can provide indirect evidence that there exists some mechanism
linking A and B, it does not normally provide evidence of the structure or features of
that mechanism. Similarly, a mechanistic study for the claim that A is a cause of B is
not normally a clinical study for the claim that A is a cause of B, because it does not
measure values of A and B together. A study will be called a mixed study if it is both
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A is a cause of B
There is a mechanism
linking A to B














Fig. 1 Evidential relationships for establishing a causal claim
a clinical study and a mechanistic study—i.e., if it both measures values of A and B
together and provides evidence of features of the mechanism linking A and B. For
clarity of exposition and since mixed studies are rare, mixed studies will not feature
in the framework developed below—the framework will consider only clinical and
mechanistic studies that are not mixed studies. Having grasped the basic framework,
it should be clear how to integrate mixed studies into the framework.
We now have the ingredients for the epistemological framework that will be used
to integrate and evaluate causal criteria. This framework is based on the evidential
relationships portrayed in Fig. 1. The connections between the top three nodes depict
the observation that establishing that A is a cause of B requires establishing that A and
B are appropriately correlated and that there exists an appropriate mechanism linking
A and B. There are two ways of confirming this latter general mechanistic claim.
Clinical studies (e.g., high-quality, large RCTs) can confirm the general mechanistic
claim (channel C2 in Fig. 1) if they find a correlation that can best be explained by the
general mechanistic claim being true, rather than by bias or confounding, say. Note
that that such studies confirm the claim that some mechanism of action exists without
shedding light of the details of this mechanism. Hence the route of confirmation,
labelled C2, proceeds directly to the general mechanistic claim rather than via a specific
mechanism hypothesis. A specific mechanism hypothesis is a hypothesis of the form: a
particular mechanism with certain features F can account for the extent of the observed
correlation. A specific mechanism hypothesis need not identify all the features of a
mechanism of action.
The second way of confirming the general mechanistic claim is by identifying the
actual mechanism of action (channel M2), whose features are confirmed by mechanis-
tic studies (M1). In addition, clinical studies provide good evidence of correlation (C1),
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and, in certain circumstances, an established mechanism of action can also provide
good evidence of correlation (channel M3).5
4 Evaluating causal criteria
We are now in a position to explore the three sets of causal criteria that were used to
assess the teratogenicity of Zika virus.
First let us consider Hill’s criteria (Table 1). Strength of association and consistency
of association primarily assess clinical studies and they play two roles. First, they
are used to infer a correlation (channel C1). Second, a strong, consistent association
is also less likely to be spurious, so when these criteria are present, confirmation
also flows along channel C2. Specificity, temporality, and biological gradient also
assess features of clinical studies and support the existence of a mechanism without
elucidating the details of the mechanism of action (channel C2). Similarly, it is clear
from Hill’s discussion of his criteria that the experiment criterion is satisfied when the
clinical study is an experimental study, rather than by experiments that shed light on
the mechanism of action (Hill 1965, p. 298). Thus this criterion also operates along
channel C2. Plausibility and coherence, on the other hand, require that the existence
of a mechanism of action should fit with evidence of the relevant mechanisms—
i.e., these assess channel M2. For Hill, Analogy operates by increasing the evidence
base by considering results from other situations that are known or suspected to be
mechanistically similar to the case in hand: ‘With the effects of thalidomide and rubella
before us, we would surely be ready to accept slighter but similar evidence with another
drug or another viral disease in pregnancy’ (Hill 1965, p. 11). Thus Analogy primarily
operates by lowering the burden of proof in the C1 and C2 channels; it does not provide
details of the mechanism of action.
Let us turn to Shepard’s criteria (Table 2). criteria 1–4 pertain to clinical studies. (1)
proven exposure and (3) careful delineation primarily help to establish a correlation
(channel C1); (2) consistent findings and (4) rare-exposure-rare-defect operate via both
C1 and C2. (5) teratogenicity in experimental animals and (7) proof in an experimental
system provide evidence that there is a robust correlation and a mechanism of action
without shedding light on any specific mechanism hypothesis (i.e., C1 and C2). (6)
biologic sense concerns the fit between the existence of a mechanism and confirmed
mechanism hypotheses and so evaluates M2. Shepard’s necessary condition can now
be seen to imply that in order to establish causality it is essential that there is support
along both the C1 and C2 channels.
Finally, consider the criteria of Krauer et al. (2017), listed in Table 3. As in the case
of Hill’s criteria; temporality, specificity and dose–response relationship concern C2;
biological plausibility, M2; strength of association, C1 and C2. Animal experiments
and analogy concern C1 and C2. Cessation confirms the existence of a correlation but
also confirms the existence of a mechanism without shedding light on features of the
mechanism, and so concerns C1 and C2. Finally, exclusion of alternative explanations
5 See Williamson (2018, Sect. 2.2.3) for one kind of example of M3-channel confirmation and Pearl and
Bareinboim (2014) for another.
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Table 4 A classification of the three sets of criteria according to the main evidential channels along which
each criterion operates
Hill Shepard Krauer et al.
C-channel Strength 1 Strength of association










boosts confirmation along the C2 channel, because, if alternative explanations really
are excluded, the correlation can only be attributable to an underlying mechanism of
action.
Having seen roughly how the different causal criteria fit into our evidential scheme,
we can begin to evaluate the criteria. The first thing to note is that most of the criteria
focus on clinical studies and the C1 and C2 channels (see Table 4). This focus can be
explained as follows. Only very rarely can one establish the existence of a correlation
solely by way of inferring the correlation from the mechanism of action (channel M3).
The only other way is an inference from clinical studies (C1). Therefore, clinical studies
are almost always required to establish causation. Furthermore, in certain cases clinical
studies suffice to establish causation. If there are sufficiently many independently
conducted RCTs of sufficient quality that observe a sufficiently large correlation,
and certain other explanations of the correlation are ruled out, then one can infer
the existence of a mechanism along the C2 channel (Williamson 2018, Sect. 2.2.1).
Therefore—if one is lucky—it can suffice to consider clinical studies and the C1 and
C2 channels. This explains the focus on the C channels.
Normally, however, one is not so lucky. The case of establishing the teratogenicity
of Zika exemplifies the typical situation: epidemiological studies on humans did not
suffice to establish causality and other evidence had to be considered. However, none
of the three sets of criteria offer more than a very rudimentary treatment of the M
channels. There is a reason for this. Mechanistic studies are very diverse, as are the
specific mechanism hypotheses that they inform, and it is hard to say anything that is
general enough to take the form of a domain-independent criterion that might feature
in one of the above lists of criteria, yet specific enough not to be hopelessly vague. We
are left with vague criteria such as ‘plausibility’, ‘coherence’ and ‘biologic sense’.
There are various ways in which one might respond to this problem of the inade-
quate treatment of the M channels. One response is to move from the general to the
particular: in particular domains, one can be more informative about the M channels.
For example, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has put forward
ten key characteristics of carcinogenicity that are used to suggest and assess specific
mechanism hypotheses (Smith et al. 2016).
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A second response is to apply the quantitative apparatus of Bayesianism to deter-
mine the probability of the causal claim conditional on the available clinical and
mechanistic studies. Landes et al. (2018) provide one such Bayesian analysis, though
determining the parameters of their Bayesian model may be challenging in practice.
A somewhat simpler Bayesian analysis is sketched in the next section.
A third response to the problem of the M channels is to apply a set of qualitative
heuristics that fit the evidential relationships set out in Fig. 1. This is the approach
of the EBM+ methodology of Parkkinen et al. (2018). According to this methodol-
ogy, clinical studies are assessed using standard methods such as the GRADE system
(Guyatt et al. 2011), and there is also a parallel stream of assessment corresponding to
the M channels, which proceeds as follows. First, specific mechanism hypotheses are
formulated, and next these are assessed by systematically searching for relevant mech-
anistic studies and then evaluating the evidence for key features of each hypothesised
mechanism of action (the M1 channel). Parkkinen et al. (2018) then provide heuristics
for combining this evaluation with the assessment of clinical studies, in order to assess
the general mechanistic hypothesis that there is some mechanism of action (i.e., to
assess the C2 and M2 channels). Finally, they provide further heuristics for assessing
the causal claim itself, given the status of the correlation claim and the status of the
claim that there is a mechanism of action. This yields an overall evaluation of the
status of the causal claim, on the basis of both clinical and mechanistic studies.
As to which response is appropriate will depend on the particular circumstances.
In the Zika case, the EBM+ approach may well be the most fruitful, since Shepard’s
domain-specific criteria of Table 2 do not shed much light on the M channels, and a
quantitative Bayesian analysis may be hard to carry out.
Alternatively, if an approach based on one or other set of causal criteria is chosen
after all, the evidential framework represented in Fig. 1 can help to weigh criteria
against one another in order to decide whether causality is established. In order for
causality to be established, one needs the following combination of criteria. First, C1-
channel criteria and any M3-criteria need to be satisfied to extent that the C1 and M3
channels jointly establish the existence of a correlation. Second, C2 criteria and M1
and M2 criteria need to be satisfied to the extent that the C2 and M2 channels jointly
establish the existence of a mechanism.
5 A Bayesian analysis
This section sketches a simple Bayesian analysis that conforms to the evidential rela-
tionships of Fig. 1. This serves several purposes. First, it shows that the general
epistemological framework of Sect. 3 is compatible with a formal Bayesian analy-
sis, which lends some support to the framework. Second, it illustrates one way to
respond to the problem of the inadequate treatment of the M-channels by the sets
of causal criteria, noted above. Third, this quantitative approach can be used to show
which evidential channels in Fig. 1 are particularly important in certain circumstances.
In what follows, C refers to the clinical study evidence; M to the mechanistic study
evidence; c to the claim that A and B are appropriately correlated; m to the claim
that A and B are appropriately mechanistically connected; h1, . . . , hk to the specific
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mechanism hypotheses that have been proposed as the mechanism of action (which
we shall take to be mutually exclusive); and h0 to the catch-all hypothesis, i.e., the
claim that none of h1, . . . , hk can be responsible for the observed correlation. Then
we have:




P(c|hi C)P(m|hi C)P(hi |M) (2)
Equation 1 captures the thesis of Russo and Williamson (2007). Equation 2 follows
if we assume that Fig. 2 represents the conditional independence structure of the
evidential relationships (motivated by Fig. 1). An undirected graph such as Fig. 2
represents conditional independence relationships by the following rule: if set Z of
variables separates set X from set Y , then X is probabilistically independent of Y
conditional on Z , which is often written as X ⊥ Y | Z . For example, C and h
separate M and m from c, so c ⊥ m, M | C, h. Here h is a variable that takes the
hypotheses h0, . . . , hk as values. c and m can be construed as binary variables.6
In a Bayesian analysis, it can be difficult to determine probabilities that involve
a catch-all hypothesis such as h0. Here, however, there are circumstances in which
this problem can be mitigated. When the clinical studies are inconclusive on their
own (e.g., when they are observational studies), and when enough is known about the
domain and sufficiently many specific mechanism hypotheses have been put forward,
P(m | h0C) will be small: should each mechanism hypothesis h1, . . . , hk be ruled
out, it will be unlikely that there is in fact any mechanism of action. Moreover, in such
a situation, h0 will also disconfirm C , and P(c | h0C) will not be large. In which case,
the contribution to the sum in Eq. 2 made by the catch-all h0 may well be negligible.
In addition, P(m | hi C) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , k (if one of the specific mechanism
hypotheses is true then trivially there is some appropriate mechanism). Then,
6 That Eq. 2 holds can be seen by viewing it as the factorisation corresponding to a Bayesian network
representation of the the same conditional independence structure.
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The first term in the product on the right-hand side evaluates the contribution of the C1
and M3 channels. The second term quantifies the M1 channel. The first term can often
be further simplified: when there is a reasonable amount of clinical study evidence
available, knowing the specific mechanism of action will not tell us much more about
the existence of a correlation, so P(c | hi C) ≈ P(c | C). In that case,




Under these conditions, then, the C1 and M1 channels are paramount. Crucially, the
M1 channel is as important as the C1 channel. This fact points to limitations of current
causal criteria, and indeed much of current practice in establishing causality in the
health sciences, which tends to underplay the role of mechanistic studies.
6 Conclusion
A problem is posed by the use of multiple sets of criteria to establish a causal claim
such as the teratogenicity of Zika. It is not clear how to evaluate and compare sets of
criteria, nor how to decide whether, for a given set of criteria, the evidence suffices to
establish causality. The epistemological framework developed in this paper is intended
to address this problem. By structuring the criteria according to the evidential channels
of Fig. 1 that they assess, one can evaluate how well a set of criteria assesses the
channels and evaluate whether, when a subset of criteria are satisfied, those criteria
could be enough to establish causality.
Unfortunately, none of the three sets of criteria considered here can be said to assess
mechanistic studies in a comprehensive way. To do that, we need to move away from
very general lists towards more domain-specific, structured criteria, as IARC have
done, or to perform a quantitative Bayesian analysis such as is provided in Sect. 5, or
to apply heuristics (e.g., the EBM+ methods) that better fit the evidential relationships
of Fig. 1.
Note that the approach developed in this paper differs markedly from the analysis
of Bird (2011), who also puts forward a framework for understanding and system-
atising the Hill criteria. Bird treats causal inference in the absence of experimental
studies as a process of elimination: if one can eliminate the possibility that B causes
A, the possibility that A and B have a common cause, and the possibility that there is
no causal relation between A and B, then one can infer that A is a cause of B. One
cannot argue with this inference from a logical point of view. However, Bird’s scheme
does not consider what are perhaps the primary grounds for eliminating these alterna-
tive possibilities in the absence of experimental clinical studies, namely mechanistic
studies. The epistemological framework developed here puts clinical and mechanistic
studies centre stage and attempts to analyse their mutual interactions.
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Howick et al. (2009) developed another framework for understanding Hill’s crite-
ria, and mechanistic studies feature in their account. They divide criteria into ‘direct
evidence’ (which acts via the C channels of the framework developed here), ‘mecha-
nistic evidence’ (the M1 channel) and ‘parallel evidence’ (which deals with coherence
amongst studies). The account presented here can be viewed as providing an expla-
nation of why and how direct evidence and mechanistic evidence complement one
another.
In sum, the epistemological framework of this paper can be viewed as compatible
with the proposals of Bird (2011) and Howick et al. (2009). But it arguably goes further
than their accounts, in that can explain the relative importance of causal criteria and
it can be used to compare sets of criteria.
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